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Abstract
Most firms issue financial assets such as debt or equity (e.g. bonds or stock)
to outside investors. While these financial assets differ greatly in their charac-
teristics, their diversity has received little attention in the literature. Filling this
important gap in the literature, this paper views debt and equity as financial
contracts and asks why they are optimal instead of other financial contracts.
By endogenizing the bankruptcy process, this paper shows how debt and equity
arise as a consequence of an optimal allocation of cash-flow rights and monitoring
rights, and how equity leads to dividend signaling.
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1 Introduction
There is a large literature that considers deals between financiers and those who need
financing, for example deals between outside investors and small startup companies.
A central question in this literature is to ask why certain financial assets such as debt
and outside equity are optimal, and why we do not observe financial assets with funda-
mentally different characteristics. While the security design literature has made great
strides in explaining a large number of stylized facts, its key challenge is that it often
views debt and equity as results of changes in model assumptions as opposed to changes
in model parameters.1 In the sense that a model is an abstraction of the real world,
the security design literature shows that in one world, all firms issue only debt, while
in another world all firms issue only equity. Clearly, these results are not a fully satis-
factory description of reality, and it is of great economic import to bring both worlds
together.
This paper bridges both worlds by rationalizing a substantial number of stylized
facts about debt and equity using a single parsimonious model. This parsimony is
a significant contribution to the literature because it allows one to investigate novel
interactions between economic forces that would otherwise be hard to explore. In doing
so, this paper combines two strands of the security design literature. On the one hand,
there are papers that focus on the assignment of control rights, but where contracts
are incomplete (see Aghion and Bolton (1992)). On the other hand, there are papers
that rely on informational frictions to derive the optimal structure of contracts (see
Townsend (1979)). Combining these two strands of the literature, this paper generates
1Notable exceptions that endogenize some or all security characteristics of both debt and equity
include Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Berglöf and von Thadden (1994), Fluck (1998), Fulghieri and
Lukin (2001), Biais et al. (2007) and DeMarzo and Fishman (2007).
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both debt and equity contracts without having to assume incompleteness for the set
of contracts. In particular, this paper shows how the interaction of cash flow rights
and monitoring rights results in optimal allocations giving rise to debt and equity
contracts. Furthermore, it shows how equity contracts lead to endogenous dividend
signaling. Finally, the paper provides novel implications for bankruptcy, making a
case for reorganization (e.g. out-of-court private negotiation or Chapter 11 bankruptcy)
instead of liquidation (e.g. Chapter 7 bankruptcy).
A major difference between this paper and most of the previous literature is the way
bankruptcy is conceptualized. The previous literature often assumes perfect ex post
enforcement of contracts through an exogenous unmodeled authority.2 While this as-
sumption has served as an important building block for laying out the foundations of
security design, it is not a fully satisfactory descriptive tool. This paper thus relaxes this
assumption and, building on Krasa and Villamil (2000), makes bankruptcy endogenous
along two dimensions. First, the investor may file with a court for bankruptcy protec-
tion and seize assets by enforcing a transfer payment. Second, the transfer payment
itself is endogenous and is part of the contract. This approach to modeling bankruptcy
is important because it endogenizes cash flow rights. Furthermore, it shows a novel way
to alleviate managerial moral hazard by incentivizing the entrepreneur to signal private
information through monetary payouts, thus furthering our understanding of optimal
payout policy and dividend signaling.
The economic intuition driving this paper’s results follows from considering two ex-
treme cases for illustration: a small startup company, e.g. a high-tech startup in Silicon
2Prior research interprets bankruptcy as a bad signal about the state of nature and the resulting
transfer of control (see Aghion and Bolton (1992)), a low payout (see Diamond (1984)), the act of
verification (see Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985)), or the intervention of outside investors
in management (see Dewatripont and Tirole (1994)).
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Valley such as Google in 1999, and a mature company, e.g. an automaker in Detroit
such as General Motors. The startup (e.g. Google) has risky cash flows because it is
uncertain whether it survives. If it survives, however, it can become highly profitable.
This profitability, together with the fact that there is asymmetric information between
an outside investor and the entrepreneur who runs the company, means that there is
also a large profit to hide. To deal with this problem, the outside investor can audit
(i.e. monitor) the firm at a cost. Since this cost is still low for the small startup, the
optimal contract has monitoring rights, especially since there may be a large profit to
hide. To capitalize on this large profit, the investor also requires state-contingent cash
flow rights. These state-contingent cash flow rights coupled with monitoring rights are
consistent with equity contracts that are used for venture capital financing of startups
like Google.3 In contrast, the monitoring of the mature company (e.g. General Motors)
is very costly because the company is large and old. Furthermore, the company’s cash
flows are stable with a low growth potential. These low-risk cash flows coupled with
high monitoring costs make monitoring unattractive. The investor thus relinquishes
her monitoring rights and is content with state-independent cash flow rights, yielding
debt as the optimal contract.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. The
key results are summarized in Section 3 by showing the relation to debt and equity
and deriving empirical predictions. The model is formally solved in Section 4, while
Section 5 provides a model extension to many states of nature. Finally, Section 6
concludes. For easier cross-referencing, results throughout this paper are summarized
3There are also small firms whose outside funding mainly consists of bank loans, i.e. debt. An
example for this type of firm is an entrepreneur running a restaurant. These firms, however, often do
not have a high growth potential or do not have very risky cash flows. They are thus unlikely to receive
venture capital (i.e. equity) financing. This is consistent with this paper as long as the relatively low
growth potential or the relatively stable cash flows dominate the cost-efficient information policy.
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in the form of lemmata and propositions, culminating in the paper’s main theorem.
The proof of the main theorem is contained in the Appendix.
Related Literature. In a closely related paper, Krasa and Villamil (2000) show that
debt and equity contracts arise as a consequence of an economic friction that determines
whether the original contract can be renegotiated. The key difference is that this paper
considers renegotiation in the spirit of Rubinstein bargaining, while Krasa and Villamil
consider a repeat-contract approach.
In the same spirit as this study, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) examine why debt
and equity differ fundamentally. Dewatripont and Tirole have several outside investors,
which allows for the simultaneous issuance of debt and equity (one investor is the
residual claimant on cash flows rights). In contrast, there is only one outside investor
in this study, which precludes the simultaneous issuance of debt and equity.
This paper also relates to the bankruptcy procedure literature, since some of its
results can be interpreted as reorganization (e.g. out-of-court private negotiation or
Chapter 11 bankruptcy) versus liquidation (e.g. Chapter 7 bankruptcy). There exists
an extensive law and economics literature that is primarily concerned with finding op-
timal bankruptcy procedures (see Roe (1983), Baird (1986), Bebchuk (1988), Aghion
et al. (1994), and Berkovitch and Israel (1999)). Similar in spirit, part of the financial
contracting literature studies the effects of bankruptcy procedures on managers’ incen-
tives (see Aghion and Bolton (1992), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), and Berkovitch
et al. (1998)) and the protection of creditors’ claims (see Cornelli and Felli (1997)).
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2 The Model
This section describes the model, whose timeline is summarized by Figure 1. Consider
two risk neutral agents, an investor with deep pockets (“she”) and a penniless en-
trepreneur (“he”). The entrepreneur has an investment opportunity and needs outside
financing. To finance the project, the investor proposes a contract that the entrepreneur
can accept or reject.4 If the entrepreneur rejects the financing, the project becomes
worthless. Ex ante, both agents share a common prior β := P (X = xH) ∈ (0, 1) about
the project’s random cash flow X ∈ {xL, xH}, where xL < xH . The common prior β
represents agents’ belief about the extent to which the entrepreneur has a profit to
hide. An alternative interpretation of β is agents’ beliefs about the growth potential
of the company. After the contract is signed, nature makes a draw and determines the
project’s cash flow realization x ∈ {xL, xH}. As a result, an informational asymmetry
arises: the entrepreneur observes the project’s cash flow, but the investor does not. In
this ex post sense, I refer to an entrepreneur with the low cash flow realization xL as
of low type, while an entrepreneur with xH is of high type.
After the cash flow realization, the entrepreneur has the opportunity to pay out parts
of this cash flow to the investor. This payout could correspond to dividends in equity
contracts, or to coupon payments in debt contracts. This payout, denoted by v ≥ 0, is
4This approach is in the spirit of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Kaplan and Strömberg (2003).
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voluntary, and it represents money on the table that cannot be withdrawn subsequently.
Note that v may be zero or strictly positive, and that there is no inherent restriction
on v that prevents the entrepreneur from overpaying or underpaying. Furthermore, it
is important to keep in mind that v is not an announcement, but an actual payout.
As such, the voluntary payout has the dual role of transferring wealth and acting as a
potential signaling device. After receiving the payout v, the investor updates her belief
about the project according to Bayes’ rule to βv := P (X = xH | V = v). She conditions
on the event {V = v}, where the conditional distribution of the random variable V |X =
xE represents the entrepreneur’s endogenous payout strategy for E ∈ {L,H}.
The contract may or may not carry monitoring rights. If it does, the investor, after
receiving v, has the opportunity to monitor (i.e. observe) the entrepreneur’s project at
a monitoring cost c. Monitoring is a binary decision (yes/no) of the investor and this
decision is observable by the entrepreneur. After her monitoring decision the investor
chooses between one of the following actions: (i) she ends the game, (ii) she initiates
bankruptcy proceedings and takes the entrepreneur to court (“enforcement”), or (iii) she
renegotiates the original contract. The first case accounts for the possibility that the
investor is content with the payout she received. The second and third cases account
for the possibility that the payout is too low, leaving the investor unsatisfied.
Enforcement resolves potentially asymmetric information: the court identifies the
project’s cash flow realization, transfers the enforceable payment from the entrepreneur
to the investor, and ends the game. Enforcement is costly for both agents. If the
investor decides to take the entrepreneur to court, each agent incurs bankruptcy costs
b > 0 that represent legal fees and expenses. The model assumes that c < 2b, which
means that the total bankruptcy costs 2b are larger than the monitoring costs c. The
motivation for this assumption is that during enforcement, the court does the equivalent
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of monitoring (i.e. finding out the true cash flow realization) and furthermore enforces
a transfer payment.
The possibility of enforcement is independent of whether the contract carries mon-
itoring rights. Even an investor who does not have monitoring rights can initiate
bankruptcy proceedings. Such an investor resolves asymmetric information by using
the court as a monitor. In this sense, the monitoring rights stipulated by the contract
refer to monitoring outside of bankruptcy. The key differences between monitoring and
enforcement are as follows: (i) monitoring does not necessarily end the game, but en-
forcement does, and (ii) monitoring does not entail a transfer payment, but enforcement
does. The first difference implies that the investor can use the information obtained
by monitoring to optimize over subsequent choices. On the other hand, if the investor
enforces, she forgoes this opportunity because enforcement ends the game.
Renegotiation, as illustrated by Figure 2, is similar in spirit to Rubinstein bargain-
ing (see Rubinstein (1982) and Rubinstein (1985)). The key differences are that (i) only
the investor makes requests and (ii) enforcement is possible in each round. Renegotia-
tion consists of an infinite number of rounds where later rounds are being discounted
since time is valuable. Time costs ensure that agents prefer early agreements by de-
priving them of incentives to play waiting games. In each renegotiation round, the
investor makes a request for a payout. The entrepreneur then accepts or rejects this
request. If he accepts, he makes the requested payout and the game ends. If he re-
jects, the investor updates her belief about the cash flow realization according to Bayes’
rule. Using her posterior belief, the investor decides whether to enforce or to continue.
Enforcement proceeds as described in the previous paragraph and the game ends after
enforcement. If the investor continues, she initiates a subsequent round of renegotiation
that is structurally identical to the previous round.
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Figure 2: One Round of Renegotiation
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This model lets the investor make the requests instead of the entrepreneur, implying
that the investor has the bargaining initiative. The reason for this modeling choice is
that the bargaining process should capture central elements of real-world Chapter 11
bankruptcy, where indeed the investor has the bargaining initiative (see Section 3 for
more details). While there might be theoretical interest in letting the entrepreneur
propose requests, this is not further pursued here because it is not a fully satisfactory
description of the economic problem addressed in this paper.
The contract consists of two parts. The first part determines whether or not the
contract carries monitoring rights. The second part is the enforceable payment f , where
f : {xL, xH} → R+. To interpret f , ignore for a moment the entrepreneur’s budget
constraint. The number f(x) denotes the payment that the investor obtains through
enforcement, given that the cash flow realization is x. If the investor is informed, she
knows that she can obtain f(x) from enforcement. If she is uninformed, she expects to
obtain (1− β)f(xL) + βf(xH), since she does not know the cash flow realization. As in
Krasa and Villamil (2000), it is important to note that f is not set by the court, but
by the contracting parties. As such, agents do not anticipate the enforceable payment
set by the court, but instead set it themselves.
The ex ante budget constraint of the entrepreneur is x − b ≥ 0. Limited liability
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of the entrepreneur ensures that the court cannot put the entrepreneur into debt. As
a consequence, the limited liability constraint f(x) ≤ x − b obtains. After making
the payout v, there is also the ex post budget constraint of the entrepreneur, given
by x − b − v ≥ 0. This is the maximum amount available for the court to seize,
without putting the entrepreneur into debt. Limited liability implies that the ex post
enforceable payment F is the minimum of the enforceable payment and the ex post
budget constraint, that is, F (x, v) := min{f(x), x− b− v}. For notational convenience,
let us define FL := F (xL, v) and FH := F (xH , v) for the remainder of this paper. The
enforceable payment F is a simplified version from Krasa and Villamil (2000), where
F may always depend on the voluntary payout v. In contrast, F in this paper only
depends on the voluntary payout if x−b−v < f(x) holds; in that case, we have F (x, v) =
x− b− v, meaning that every dollar paid out reduces the enforceable payment by one
dollar. This simplifying assumption ensures that the optimization problems of the
entrepreneur and the investor during the potentially infinite renegotiation stage under
potentially asymmetric information are well behaved, so that an analytical solution can
be derived recursively.
Given the notation introduced in the previous paragraphs, Table 1 summarizes
agents’ payoffs. When interpreting this table, it is important to keep in mind that
consumption takes place only after the game ends. Furthermore, time preferences of
agents during renegotiation are modeled using the discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
3 Preview of Key Results
This section provides a preview of this paper’s key results. Since discounting is assumed
to be sufficiently small throughout the paper, the following corollary restates the main
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Table 1: Investor’s and Entrepreneur’s Payoffs
This table summarizes the payoffs of the investor and the entrepreneur. Consumption
takes place only after the game ends. Row (1) obtains if the investor ends the game
immediately after her monitoring decision. This implies that the investor does not
enforce and that the investor does not enter into renegotiation. Row (2) obtains from
immediate enforcement, that is, enforcement before renegotiation takes place. Row (3)
obtains if agents enter renegotiation and the entrepreneur accepts a request for a payout
of size r in round k, where δ ∈ (0, 1) represents agents’ time preferences (time is
valuable). Row (4) obtains if the investor enforces in round k.
Investor Entrepreneur
(1) No enforcement, no renegotiation v x− v
(2) Immediate enforcement v + F (x, v)− b x− v − F (x, v)− b
(3) Renegotiation w/o enforcement δk(v + r) δk(x− v − r)
(4) Renegotiation with enforcement δk(v + F (x, v)− b) δk(x− v − F (x, v)− b)
theorem from Section 4.4 for the limiting case δ → 1.
Corollary. As discounting vanishes, that is, as δ → 1, the following results obtain.
For any parameter values, agents end up negotiating their way around enforcement. If
β < c/(xH − xL), the optimal contract is state-independent since f(xL) = f(xH), and
the contract does not carry monitoring rights outside of bankruptcy. In this case, the
entrepreneur conceals information by pooling his payout v at zero. If c/(xH − xL) ≤ β,
the optimal contract is state-contingent since f(xH) ≥ f(xL) + c/β, and the contract
carries monitoring rights. In this case, the entrepreneur reveals the state of the project’s
cash flow by signaling this private information with the voluntary payout v.
Figure 3 illustrates how the optimal contract relates to debt and equity. As the
figure shows, two major cases obtain: β < c/(xH − xL), corresponding to debt, and
β > c/(xH − xL), corresponding to equity. There is also the borderline case of β =
c/(xH − xL) in which agents may play a mixed strategy over debt and equity. With
some caution, this case might be interpreted as a simple form of capital structure,
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Figure 3: Debt and Equity
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i.e. a combination of debt and equity. For a true capital structure to emerge, a second
outside investor would be needed as a residual claimant (see Dewatripont and Tirole
(1994)). The following discussion thus puts aside this borderline case and focuses on
the pure-debt and pure-equity cases that are typical for a single investor.
To discuss the debt-like contract, suppose that β < c/(xH − xL), which means that
the monitoring costs are large, the stakes are small, and agents are relatively certain
that the investment project’s growth potential is small. By “small stakes” I mean that
the potential cash flow realizations xL and xH are relatively close together. When these
conditions are satisfied, the corollary states that the contract does not carry monitoring
rights outside of bankruptcy. Furthermore, the contract induces cash flow rights that
are state-independent. Payout policy is nonexistent in the sense that the entrepreneur
makes no voluntary payout and does not reveal information to the investor. As a
consequence, the optimal contract is debt-like.
Alternatively, it is possible to argue that one could always assign monitoring rights to
the debt-like contract, since monitoring rights in this model can be assigned at no cost.
One could interpret this contract as a degenerate equity contract, where “degenerate”
means that cash flow rights are state-independent instead of state-contingent. However,
if an arbitrarily small cost of assigning monitoring rights is introduced into the model,
this result breaks down and, consistent with reality, debt contracts no longer confer
monitoring rights outside of bankruptcy. This is so because agents know from the
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outset that, with debt, it is too costly to exercise these monitoring rights. That is,
monitoring will not take place, even if it is allowed by the contract. The costs of
assigning monitoring rights can be justified by increased legal fees, since lawyers need
to be paid, e.g. to work out the details of what monitoring means and the conditions
describing when this right can be exercised.5 It is important to keep in mind that
these costs do not have to be large. In fact, arbitrarily small costs are sufficient for the
degenerate equity contract to be replaced by debt.
In this debt-like contract, it is important to note that the statement f(xL) = f(xH)
does not automatically imply that the outside investor’s cash flow rights are always
state-independent. Whether bankruptcy occurs still does have an effect on cash flow
rights, like it has in real-life defaultable debt. This is so because bankruptcy entails
deadweight costs, so the outside investor’s payoff is different in bankruptcy.
To discuss the equity-like contract, suppose that β > c/(xH − xL), meaning that
the monitoring costs are small, the stakes are large, and agents are relatively certain
that the growth potential of the project is high. In this case, the corollary states
that the contract carries unconditional monitoring rights and induces cash flow rights
that are state-contingent. Furthermore, endogenous dividend signaling obtains. As a
consequence, the optimal contract is equity-like. The optimal contract, in particular,
is preferred equity, which has seniority over common stock. Seniority means in this
case that in the event of a bankruptcy, holders of preferred stock receive money before
common stockholders do. This is consistent with the above contract since the investor
still may receive a payout in bankruptcy. Furthermore, holders of preferred stock receive
dividends before common stockholders receive any payouts. Dividends are, however,
5The literature on incomplete contracts is based on a related assumption, namely that writing
complete contracts is prohibitively costly. A complete contract specifies all rights and duties for every
possible future state of the world.
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not guaranteed even with preferred stock, which means that dividend signaling is still
possible.
It is important to note that, although endogenous dividend signaling is a key result
of this paper, dividends are not necessary for the remaining results to hold. Even if the
voluntary payout v is omitted from the model, all remaining results about cash flow
rights and monitoring rights stay qualitatively the same.
This paper also makes a case for renegotiation instead of liquidation of a company,
e.g. out-of-court private negotiation or Chapter 11 bankruptcy instead of Chapter 7
bankruptcy under the United States’ Bankruptcy Code.6 Chapter 7 bankruptcy directly
corresponds to enforcement in this paper, meaning that the company is liquidated.
In contrast, out-of-court private negotiation or Chapter 11 bankruptcy means that
the company is reorganized. For Chapter 11 bankruptcy, most of the action happens
out of court, although investors formally file with a court for protection. Chapter 11
bankruptcy usually means that investors take control of business operations, subject
to the oversight and jurisdiction of the court. The goal of Chapter 11 bankruptcy as
well as out-of-court private negotiation is not liquidation, but the reorganization of the
company to avoid the deadweight costs associated with liquidation and to increase ex
post efficiency. The same idea applies to the equilibrium in this paper, where agents
renegotiate their way around enforcement (i.e. around Chapter 7 bankruptcy) to avoid
enforcement costs and to increase ex post efficiency.
6For a description of the economics of bankruptcy procedures used around the world, see Aghion
et al. (1994).
14
4 Optimal Contract and Endogenous Payout Policy
This section solves the model. The equilibrium concept is that of a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium with subgame perfection. The analysis proceeds backwards.
4.1 Informed Investor
Consider an informed investor in the last stage of the game (see Figure 1). Being
informed means that the investor knows the cash flow realization x, which can be
brought about by monitoring, or by signaling on the part of the entrepreneur. Given
this information structure, the following lemma characterizes the entrepreneur’s decision
to accept or reject requests for payouts during renegotiation.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, the entrepreneur accepts a request with probability one if he
is indifferent between accepting and subsequent enforcement.
Figure 4 illustrates the intuition behind Lemma 1 by showing the investor’s expected
utility as a function of the payout request made by the investor. The jump in the figure
occurs because of enforcement and bankruptcy costs. For an equilibrium to exist,
the figure needs to have a well-defined maximum. This maximum only exists if the
entrepreneur accepts with probability 1.
Proposition 1 (Informed Investor). Assume that discounting is sufficiently moderate.7
At the last stage of the game, the informed investor enters renegotiation, makes the
request F (x, v) + b in the first round, and the entrepreneur accepts. The investor’s
utility is δ(v+F (x, v) + b), and, with subscript i denoting that the investor is informed,
the entrepreneur’s utility is given by piEi := δ(x− v − F (x, v)− b).
7This statement means that δ exceeds a given constant in the unit interval. This constant does
not contribute to the economic intuition and is not stated explicitly. It can be derived from the
corresponding proofs.
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Figure 4: On the left-hand side, the entrepreneur accepts the request F (x, v) + b with
probability 1. On the right-hand side, the entrepreneur rejects the request F (x, v) + b
with strictly positive probability.
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The case of the informed investor illustrates two key features of the model. First,
agents renegotiate their way around enforcement because enforcement entails dead-
weight costs. Second, the investor has a first-mover advantage by anticipating the
entrepreneur’s reaction and thus exploiting it. As a result, the investor avoids paying
her own bankruptcy costs and furthermore coaxes the entrepreneur towards transferring
his bankruptcy cost to her. I refer to this effect as the double benefit of renegotiation.
4.2 Uninformed Investor at the Last Stage of the Game
Instead of an informed investor, we now consider an uninformed investor (βv ∈ (0, 1))
at the last stage of the game (see Figure 1). To make the derivation of the results
more intuitive, I introduce an auxiliary constraint on the set of admissible contracts.
The purpose of this constraint is to eliminate a few unimportant corner cases. It
also is possible to derive this paper’s results without this auxiliary constraint, but it
would complicate the presentation, while not yielding deeper economic insights. This
constrained is termed the proportionality constraint, and it states that the court may
not seize more from the poor than it seizes from the rich, i.e. f(xL) ≤ f(xH).
There are two potential equilibria during renegotiation under asymmetric informa-
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tion. First, the investor renegotiates according to a worst-case scenario, ensuring that
every type has incentives to accept in the first round. This request is FL + b, and it is
obtained by making the low type indifferent between accepting and enforcement. I refer
to this case as take-it-or-leave-it (t). Second, the investor screens the entrepreneur by
extending renegotiation to two rounds. In the first round, she makes a request r1 such
that the high type accepts and the low type rejects. In the second round she makes a
request r2 = FL + b such that the low type accepts. I refer to this case as elicitation
tactics (e), which can be rationalized from a hypothetical last stage of the game by the
investor’s belief that the entrepreneur will reject all subsequent requests. Satisfying a
no-mimicking constraint and using the proportionality constraint, it can be shown that
r1 = δr2 + (1− δ)(xH − v) > r2.
If the investor is fairly certain that she faces a high type, she might be tempted to
make a request larger than r1, forcing the high type to accept by threatening enforce-
ment. The problem with this approach is that enforcement after such a high request
is not credible. The dilemma is that, after a rejection of such a request, the investor
becomes informed: she knows that she is facing a low type because a high type would
have accepted. However, now that she knows x = xL, she no longer has any incentive
to enforce. Instead, tailoring a specific request to the low type gives her a higher utility
because of the double benefit of renegotiation (see Proposition 1). She thus deviates and
does not enforce, making a request larger than r1 infeasible. This result is summarized
as follows.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, the uninformed investor cannot make a request larger than r1
and force a high type to accept by threatening enforcement otherwise.
The two equilibrium properties of renegotiation from Section 4.1 also apply to this
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section: agents never enforce during renegotiation because of deadweight costs; further-
more, the investor exploits the double benefit of renegotiation. As a result, the investor
never ends the game immediately after her monitoring decision because it is dominated
by renegotiation. These results are summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Uninformed Investor Part 1). Assume that discounting is sufficiently
moderate. At the last stage of the game, the uninformed investor renegotiates through
take-it-or-leave-it or elicitation tactics, or she enforces immediately. (The investor
never ends the game immediately after her monitoring decision.) Her expected utilities
from playing take-it-or-leave-it and elicitation tactics are piIt := δ(v + FL + b) and
piIe := δ2(v + FL + b) + δ(1 − δ)βvxH , respectively. The entrepreneur’s utilities are
piEt := δ(xE − v − FL − b) and piEe := δ2(xE − v − FL − b) for all E ∈ {L,H}.
4.3 Uninformed Investor at the Second to Last Stage
Consider the uninformed investor at the second to last stage of the game (see Figure 1),
and assume for now that the contract carries monitoring rights. If the investor mon-
itors (m), she is subsequently informed, and by Proposition 1 her expected utility is
piIm := δ[v+ (1− βv)FL + βvFH + b− c]. Since monitoring makes the investor informed,
the entrepreneur’s utility is piEm := piEi .
For the uninformed investor, monitoring strictly dominates immediate enforcement
in expectation, since the total bankruptcy costs are larger than the monitoring costs
(formally, c < 2b, as discussed in Section 2). Propositions 1 and 2 then imply that the
investor always enters renegotiation. The following proposition summarizes.
Proposition 3 (Uninformed Investor Part 2). Assume that discounting is sufficiently
moderate. Consider the uninformed investor (i.e. βv ∈ (0, 1)) at the second to last stage
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of the game. In this case, the investor plays either take-it-or-leave-it, elicitation tactics,
or she monitors and plays according to Proposition 1.
4.4 Deriving the Optimal Contract
The following steps derive the optimal contract and the entrepreneur’s payout policy.
A central element in the following analysis is the investor’s posterior belief βv ∈ [0, 1]
about the entrepreneur’s type. This posterior belief determines the action taken by the
investor, which in turn determines the entrepreneur’s utility. The entrepreneur’s utility
is thus a function of the investor’s posterior in equilibrium. However, the entrepreneur
may change the investor’s posterior by choosing a appropriate payout strategy for his
voluntary payout v. So by appropriately choosing a payout strategy, the entrepreneur
may be able to influence whether his utility function is going to be piEi , piEt , piEe , or piEm.
In the following steps, we thus think of piEi , piEt , piEe , and piEm as functions of the voluntary
payout v. Also suppose for the time being that the contract carries monitoring rights.
Step 1: The Low Type’s Limited Liability Constraint Is Binding
Proposition 4 (Limited Liability). Assume that discounting is sufficiently moderate.
Then the low type’s limited liability constraint is binding in equilibrium, i.e. f(xL) =
xL − b.
Because of this result, the remainder of the paper fixes the enforceable payment of
the low type at f(xL) = xL− b. The economic intuition follows directly from Figure 5.
If the low type’s limited liability constraint is not binding and thus f(xL) < xL − b,
the entrepreneur refuses any payout (i.e. v = 0). The investor thus has nothing to lose
by increasing f(xL) until limited liability binds. Note that the same type of argument
19
Figure 5: Low and High Types’ Utilities When f(x) < x− b
-
6
vxL
piL(vxL)
0
xL − f(xL)− b
δ(xL − f(xL)− b)
δ2(xL − f(xL)− b)
@
@
@
@
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
piLi = piLt = piLm
piLe
-
6
vxH
piH(vxH )
0
xL − f(xL)− bxH − f(xH)− b
δ(xH − f(xL)− b)
δ2(xH − f(xL)− b)
δ(xH − f(xH)− b)
HH
H
PP
PP
PP
PP
PP
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
piHt
piHe
piHi = piHm
does not go through in analogy for the enforceable payment f(xH) of the high type.
When considering f(xH), there are cases in which the entrepreneur has incentives to
signal his type, which prevents the argument from going through unchanged.
Step 2: Posterior Beliefs and the Investor’s Best Response
The investor’s best response after observing the payout v critically depends on her
posterior βv. Since this posterior is a number in the unit interval (0, 1), it is useful
to partition the unit interval into subintervals that make it easy to characterize the
investor’s best response. These subintervals are given by
Θt :=
(
0,min{θ1, θ2}
]
, Θe := [θ1, θ3], Θm :=
[
max{θ2, θ3}, 1
)
, (1)
where we only consider the part of the Θj that overlaps with the interval (0, 1) and
where θ1 := xLxH , θ2 :=
c
f(xH)−f(xL) , θ3 :=
c−(1−δ)xL
f(xH)−f(xL)−(1−δ)xH . Depending on the game’s
parameters, the partition of the unit interval consists of two or three intervals. Figure 6
illustrates the case with three intervals. The interpretation of these intervals is about
the optimism of the investor pertaining to the investment project’s cash flow realization.
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Figure 6: The Intervals Θt, Θe, and Θm Partition the Unit Interval
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If βv ∈ Θt, for example, the investor is relatively certain that a low cash flow realization
occurred. On the other hand, βv ∈ Θm means that the investor is confident that there
was a high cash flow realization.
Proposition 5 (Posterior Beliefs Matter). Assume that discounting is sufficiently mod-
erate. Consider the uninformed investor at the second to last stage of the game. If
f(xL) = f(xH), the investor never plays m and decides between playing t and e by
piIt ≤ piIe ⇔ βv ∈ [θ1, 1). If f(xL) < f(xH) and βv ∈ Θj, then it is optimal for the
investor to play j.
Similar to Rubinstein (1985), Proposition 5 specifies a clear connection between the
investor’s belief and the equilibrium. If βv ∈ Θt and the investor is thus relatively
certain to be facing a low type, the investor plays take-it-or-leave-it. This is so because
time is valuable and the investor does not want to lose time speculating on the unlikely
event of facing a high type. If on the other hand βv ∈ Θe and the investor is thus more
certain to be facing a high type, the investor plays elicitation tactics. This strategy is
optimal, since the investor is now willing to take the gamble by trying to screen the
entrepreneur. Finally, if βv ∈ Θm and the investor is thus even more certain that the
entrepreneur is the high type, she is willing to spend the monitoring costs to become
informed. Monitoring is optimal because the investor knows that her bargaining power
is much higher in a perfect information game than in a game of incomplete information.
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Step 3: Prior Beliefs and the Entrepreneur’s Best Response
Knowing the investor’s response to a given posterior belief from Proposition 5, the
entrepreneur can decide on his optimal payout policy.
Proposition 6 (Prior Beliefs Matter). Assume that discounting is sufficiently moderate.
Suppose that f(xH) = f(xL). If β < θ1, the entrepreneur pools his payout at zero. If
β ≥ θ1, the entrepreneur signals his type.
Suppose that f(xH) > f(xL). If β ∈ (Θt∪Θe)o, the entrepreneur pools his payout at
zero. If β ∈ Θm, the entrepreneur plays a potentially degenerate mixed strategy between
signaling and payout pooling at zero.
The key driving force behind this result is that with f(xL) = xL − b at its limited
liability constraint (see Proposition 4), the low type’s utility is always zero, no matter
whether payout pooling or signaling via v occurs. So for payout pooling or signaling,
only the incentives of the high type matter. And the high type’s incentives are to
mislead the investor as far as possible, as will be discussed next.
There are two cases to consider. First, suppose that the investor has a belief β that
is relatively close to zero, meaning that the investor thinks she likely faces a low type.
If, against the investor’s conjecture, nature has in fact drawn a high type, the high type
does not want to reveal that he is hiding a high cash flow realization. He therefore pools
his payout with the low type. Second, suppose that the investor has a belief β that
is relatively close to 1, meaning that the investor thinks she likely faces a high type.
This believe makes it optimal for the investor to monitor, should the entrepreneur not
signal his type. As a consequence, the entrepreneur is indifferent between pooling and
signaling, since in both cases the investor will end up being informed and will proceed
according to Proposition 1.
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Step 4: Optimal Contract and Payout Policy
Given the entrepreneur’s optimal payout policy from the previous step, the investor is
now able to figure out the optimal contract. As in the previous step, there are two
cases to consider. The first case is about the investor having a prior belief β that is
relatively close to zero, so the investor believes to likely face a low type. In this case, the
investor knows that she is going to play either take-it-or-leave-it or elicitation tactics,
and for both of these strategies the investor cannot commit to making a request that
depends on f(xH), as shown by Lemma 2. This is why it is optimal for her to choose a
value f(xH) that is equal or close to f(xL), since f(xH) is irrelevant for the investor’s
payoff. The investor also knows that any monitoring threat is not credible, and thus
she does not need to assign monitoring rights to the optimal contract.
The second case is that of a prior belief β being relatively close to 1, meaning
that the investor believes that she is likely to face a high type. Given this belief,
the investor knows that she will monitor and become informed. Since the payoff of
the informed investor does depend on f(xH), she wants to choose f(xH) as large as
possible. This gives rise to a state-contingent contract with attached monitoring rights.
The entrepreneur, however, offers a tradeoff to the investor. If the investor chooses
a slightly lower f(xH), the entrepreneur is willing to signal his type and thus save
the monitoring costs for the investor. This offer is possible since the entrepreneur can
credibly commit to signaling by Proposition 6.
The following theorem formalizes and refines the argument above. The refinement
lies in comparing monitoring with take-it-or-leave-it (when β < θ1), and comparing
monitoring with elicitation tactics (when θ1 ≤ β). Both cases are similar in the sense
that the former is the limit of the latter when discounting vanishes, i.e. when δ → 1.
Figure 7 illustrates the enforceable payment of the high type as a function of the
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Figure 7: Optimal Enforceable Payment for the High Type when δ → 1
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prior belief in the limiting case, illustrating that the contract is state-independent on
the left-hand-side (i.e. f(xH) = f(xL)) and state-contingent on the right-hand-side
(i.e. f(xH) 6= f(xL)). For the following theorem, the definitions of new cutoff values for
the prior belief β are necessary.
¯
β := c
xH − xL , β¯ :=
2c
xH − xL , ¯
β′ := c− (1− δ)xL
xH − xL − (1− δ)xH , β¯
′ := 2c− (1− δ)xL
xH − xL − (1− δ)xH .
Observe that limδ→1
¯
β′ =
¯
β and limδ→1 β¯′ = β¯ imply that the theorem’s second part
collapses to its first part. If discounting vanishes (i.e. δ → 1), the theorem yields the
corollary from Section 3.
Theorem (Optimal Contract and Payout Policy). Assume that discounting is suffi-
ciently moderate. By Proposition 4, f(xL) = xL − b.
Suppose that β < θ1. Then:
f(xH) =

f(xL) if β ∈ (0,
¯
β)
f(xL) + c/β if β ∈ [
¯
β, β¯]
xH − b− c/β if β ∈ (β¯, 1)
(2)
The payout policy and monitoring rights are related as follows. If β <
¯
β, the contract
does not carry monitoring rights, and the entrepreneur pools his payout. If
¯
β ≤ β, the
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contract carries monitoring rights, and the entrepreneur signals his type.
Suppose that θ1 ≤ β. Then payout policy and monitoring rights relate in the same
way as above with
¯
β replaced by
¯
β′, and f(xH) given by
f(xH) =

f(xL) + 2(1− δ)(xH − xL) if β ∈ (0,
¯
β′)
f(xL) + c/β + (1− δ)(xH − xL/β) if β ∈ [
¯
β′, β¯′]
xH − b− c/β if β ∈ (β¯′, 1)
(3)
5 Extending the State Space
In the previous sections, the entire analysis assumes that there are only two realizations
of the state of nature x ∈ {xL, xH}. This section extends the state space so that the
investment project’s cash flow realization is drawn from an uncountable set. In addition
to checking the robustness of the results from the previous model, it is possible to
distinguish debt and equity contracts from other financial contracts, e.g. call options,
depending on whether the payments are concave, affine, or convex.
The cash flow realization x is drawn from the continuous uniform distribution,
i.e. the random variable X follows X ∼ U[0, 1]. To keep this variant of the model
parsimonious and to focus on its essential elements, bankruptcy costs are assumed away
and renegotiation is limited to one round. The remaining ingredients of the model stay
unchanged.
Consider the case where the investor has monitored and is thus informed. Here as
well as in the remainder of this section, the entrepreneur has no incentives to make a
voluntary payout, so v = 0. (This is in line with the discussion in Section 3, where
the voluntary payment is also not necessary to derive the remaining results about
cash flow rights and monitoring rights.) Standing at the last stage of the game, the
investor always enforces whenever f(x) > 0. The entrepreneur, knowing the investor’s
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enforcement decision, refuses any request r > f(x) and accepts any request r < f(x). In
turn, the investor chooses her request r in a way that makes the entrepreneur indifferent
between accepting and refusing. This request is given by r = f(x). In equilibrium, the
entrepreneur accepts this request (compare Lemma 1). Given this optimal request, the
investor can figure out the optimal contract f , which pins down the entrepreneur to
his reservation utility of zero. This optimal contract is given by f(x) = x, which is
typical for an all-equity financed firm. Next, we discuss the complementary case of an
uninformed investor.
Consider the case where the investor has not monitored and is thus uninformed.
In the last stage of the game, the investor enforces whenever E[f(X)] > 0. The en-
trepreneur, who knows the cash flow realization x, refuses if r > f(x) and accepts if
r < f(x). Similarly to the case of the informed investor, the uninformed investor pins
down the entrepreneur to his reservation utility when deciding on the optimal contract.
The difference is that this pinning down now happens in expectation. Furthermore,
the investor can jointly determine the optimal contract f and the optimal request r,
since the information available to the investor does not change over the first part of the
game. As the following paragraph shows, there are multiple combinations of f and r
that are optimal.
When deriving the optimal contract f together with the optimal request r, the in-
vestor maximizes her expected utility. Since there are no deadweight costs, any increase
in the investor’s expected utility is accomplished by a decrease in the entrepreneur’s
expected utility. (Both expected utilities always sum up to E[X] = 1/2.) As a con-
sequence, any combination of f and r that makes the entrepreneur’s expected utility
equal to his reservation utility of zero maximizes the investor’s expected utility. One
such combination is f(x) = min{x, 0.7} and r = 0.56, since it sets the entrepreneur’s ex-
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pected utility to zero, i.e. (E[X]−E[f(X)])P (r > f(X))+(E[X]−r)P (r ≤ f(X)) = 0.
The optimal contract f(x) = min{x, 0.7} is typical for an all-debt financed firm. Hav-
ing established the optimal contracts for the informed and uninformed investor, we still
need to consider when it is optimal for the investor to become informed.
When choosing the optimal contract at the outset of the game, the investor needs
to consider whether it will be optimal for her to become informed later in the game by
making use of her monitoring technology. In the same way as in Section 3, monitoring
costs are a key determinant for this decision. If the monitoring costs are low, the
investor knows at the outset that it will be optimal for her to monitor. She thus assigns
monitoring rights to the contract, and chooses the equity contract f(x) = x. On the
other hand, if the monitoring costs are high, the optimal contract does not contain
monitoring rights, and the investor chooses the debt contract f(x) = max{x, 0.7}. The
qualitative conclusions obtained in previous sections about debt and equity in terms of
cash flow rights and monitoring rights thus continue to hold in the case of more than
two states of nature.
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature by investigating the diversity of financial as-
sets, which has so far received little attention in the literature. It answers why debt
and equity have optimal characteristics and furthermore sheds light on the economic
circumstances in which debt or equity are optimal. While the prior literature has
considered models that explain some of these results in separation, the results in this
paper combine various strands of the literature and unify them in a parsimonious model.
The distinguishing feature of this model is that, building on Krasa and Villamil (2000),
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bankruptcy is endogenized. Using endogenous bankruptcy, the results in this paper con-
sistently describe the financing of small fast-growing startups through equity and the
financing of large and mature companies through debt. Furthermore, it provides novel
policy implications for bankruptcy, making the case for reorganization (e.g. out-of-court
private negotiation or Chapter 11 bankruptcy) instead of liquidation (e.g. Chapter 7
bankruptcy).
Appendix
Proof of the Main Theorem. This proof discusses the case β < θ1; the case β ≥ θ1 follows
from a related line of argument. Let ΠIm(ζ, f(xH)) denote the investor’s ex ante expected
utility when β ∈ Θm and when the entrepreneur plays (vL, vH) = (ε, 0) with probability ζ
and (vL, vH) = (0, 0) with probability 1 − ζ, for some ε > 0. The case β < θ1 implies that
the uninformed investor never plays e, and instead decides between playing t and m (see
Propositions 5 and 6), i.e. β ∈ Θt or β ∈ Θm. With λ := f(xL) + c/β and M := [λ, xH − b],
it then holds that (β ∈ Θm ⇔ f(xH) ∈ M), since θ2 ≤ β is equivalent to λ ≤ f(xH). The
definition ofM implies thatM = ∅ ⇔ β <
¯
β. If f(xH) = f(xL), then by Propositions 5 and 6
the entrepreneur pools his payout at zero, and the investor plays t and obtains piIt = δxL.
Suppose that the game’s parameters are such that β <
¯
β. That is, M = ∅, and there
exists no f(xH) ∈ [f(xL), xH − b] such that β ∈ Θm. Independent of the value of f(xH), the
entrepreneur pools at zero and the investor plays t. Since f(xL) = xL − b, it follows that
piIt = δxL for all f(xH). As a consequence, it is optimal for the investor to set f(xH) = f(xL).
Suppose that the game’s parameters are such that β >
¯
β. That is, λ < xH − b, and
the interval M has positive length. By playing f(xH) ∈ M , the investor can obtain at least
ΠIm(0, xH − b) = δ[(1 − β)xL + βxH − c], since ΠIm is increasing in f(xH), and since the
entrepreneur’s maximal punishment consists of playing ζ = 0. Since β >
¯
β implies that
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c < β(xH − xL), it holds that ΠIm(0, xH − b) > δxL = piIt . As a consequence, it is always
optimal for the investor to play f(xH) ∈ M . Knowing that the investor plays f(xH) ∈ M ,
the entrepreneur plays a trigger strategy in the following sense. If the investor chooses a
large value of f(xH), the entrepreneur plays maximal punishment by setting ζ = 0. If the
investor chooses a low value of f(xH), the entrepreneur rewards the investor by signaling with
probability 1. That is, the entrepreneur plays the trigger strategy ζl(f(xH)) := 1(f(xH) ≤ l),
where l denotes the threshold level and 1 denotes the indicator function. The entrepreneur
chooses the threshold level l as small as possible such that it is still optimal for the investor
to play f(xH) = l. That is, the entrepreneur chooses the smallest threshold level l ∈M such
that ΠIm(0, xH − b) ≤ ΠIm(1, l) still holds.
Suppose that ΠIm(0, xH − b) ≤ ΠIm(1, λ), that is, β ≤ β¯. In this case it is optimal for the
entrepreneur to play l = λ. In equilibrium, the investor plays f(xH) = λ, and the entrepreneur
signals with probability 1. Although the investor does not monitor in equilibrium, she still
assigns monitoring rights to the contract. Suppose that ΠIm(1, λ) < ΠIm(0, xH − b), that is,
β¯ < β. In this case it is optimal for the entrepreneur to play l > λ such that ΠIm(1, l) =
ΠIm(0, xH − b). Such an l exists and is given by l = xH − b− c/β. In equilibrium, the investor
plays f(xH) = xH − b− c/β, the entrepreneur signals with probability 1, and the investor also
assigns monitoring rights to the contract.
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